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In spite of relevant differences between countries, a common international pattern emerges: 
daughters leave parental homes earlier than sons. Drawing upon the European Community 
Household Panel, we explore the impacts of various factors that affect daughters’ and sons’ 
home-leaving decisions. Our results show important differences across genders as well as 
across countries. The decisions of daughters appear to be more responsive than sons’ to 
family structure as well as to institutional factors such as the labor and the mortgage market. 
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A general feature of transitions to adulthood in contemporary developed so-
cieties is that young adults tend to study longer, to enter the labor market,
leave the parental home, cohabit, marry, and become parents later. Recent
data show striking diﬀerences in the timing of leaving home for adult chil-
dren across Europe. In Finland and Denmark, children leave the household
between 18 and 22 after which a very negligible proportion still cohabit with
their parents. At the other end of the spectrum, in Southern countries, a
negligible proportion leaves the household between 18 and 22 and most of
them remain home until 30. The so called “latest-late” pattern of transition
to adulthood (Billari and Kohler, 2004) is linked to the rising age at which
young adults complete their education and enter the labor market, leave
home, form a union and give ﬁrst birth. Given the similarities of human
capital accumulation, one could expect that young women’s transition to
adulthood would not be diﬀerent from that of young men. Recent analy-
sis of education attainment by gender has shown in fact that women ﬁnish
school earlier than men (Cammelli 2005).
In spite of the diﬀerences between countries, a common pattern emerges
across countries studied: young women leave home earlier than men (2-3
years). The diﬀerence in age young adults that leave the parental home by
gender can be certainly in part correlated to the diﬀerence in age at ﬁrst
marriage. However, the number of children leaving parental home at the
time of the ﬁrst union has declined and is more than 50 percent only in
Southern Europe and less than 25% in the North (Billari et al. 2001).
In our paper we aim to analyze gender diﬀerences in a comparative frame-
work and explore whether and where institutional factors characterizing the
labor market and the mortgagemarket have diﬀerent impacts on daughters
and sons’ probability of leaving parental home. No research to our knowl-
edge has speciﬁcally focused on these aspects. Given the diﬀerences in home
leaving decisions across countries, we use the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP henceforth), a large international dataset on households.
We complement this information with indicators of local marriage, labor
markets, mortgage markets imperfections and social expenditures invested
in youth.
While other papers on home-leaving decisions have considered men and
women separately in a tangential manner (Aasve et al (2001), Le Blanc and
Wolﬀ (2006), for us the gender diﬀerences are the primary focus. Relative
to previous work, we explore this dimension by including in our empirical
analysis also measures of labor market, mortgage market and youth policies
1characteristics. We ﬁnd some important diﬀerences in these institutional
eﬀects on home-leaving across genders.
Why is it important to analyze home-leaving decisions separately for
women and men? For women a late transition to adulthood implies a delay
in cohabitation, marriage and fertility. Southern European countries have
the highest median age at leaving home as well as the highest median age
at parenthood, and fertility is among the lowest, with a clear trend towards
further postponement. The average age at ﬁrst birth is also important be-
cause it inﬂuences the total number of children a woman might have as well
as the population size, and it may aﬀect birth weight and birth defects.
For men a slower transition to adulthood may be also critical for the
household division of labor, meaning that they accumulate little experience
of sharing household chores with partners with potential eﬀects on their
wives’ labor supply, career and fertility, especially in countries where child
care services are less widespread and/ore more expensive (Esping Andersen
et al., 2007). Recent time use data show that Southern European husbands
contribute less to housework and the excessive burden on women and that
can be considered strongly correlated with low fertility (Rosina, 2004).
The results of our empirical analysis show that men are more irresponsive
than women to changes in labor and mortgage markets. The design of labor
market policies that are intended to promote mobility (going where the
jobs are, for example) may well wish to take into account these types of
diﬀerences.
In Section 2 we review the recent literature and discuss the objectives
and implications of our research. In Section 3 we describe the data set
and the characteristics of the sample. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our
econometric strategy and discuss the empirical estimates. Section 6 provides
conclusive remarks.
2 Recent literature
A large number of studies analyzing adult children’s living arrangements
have explored the factors aﬀecting the transition towards independent liv-
ing. The seminal paper by Mc Elroy (1985) and other research has empha-
sized the role of the family as an insurance mechanism against employment
risk. Parent’s income can support children by supplying space and ﬁnan-
cial help within the parental house. They can also provide support them
by transferring resources to allow their children to achieve an independent
living arrangement. Parents’ resources appear to be an important factor
2which aﬀects the trade-oﬀ between living at home and living independently.
Le Blanc and Wolﬀ (2006) show positive eﬀects of parents’ income on home-
leaving decision.
While parental resources are important in determining the trade-oﬀ be-
tween living at home or living independently, the institutional characteris-
tics of the environment also play a role. The most important institution
which may aﬀect the independence of youths is the labor market. Card and
Lemieux (2000) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) show that the proba-
bility of living with parents is higher among unemployed and low-income
groups in Canada and the US. The family is also important in Southern
Europe where unemployment rates are higher and the welfare state oﬀers
even less protection to the unemployed or less support to young job seekers
(Becker et al., 2004).
Another important institution aﬀecting the cost of adult children leaving
the parental home has to do with the mortgage market. Martins and Vil-
lanueva (2006) show that limited access to mortgage markets explains why
young adults live with their parents and diﬀerences in mortgage market im-
perfections within Europe can explain up to 20 percent of the cross- country
variance of establishing a new household. Similar results emerge in research
regarding individual countries: Ermisch (1999) for the UK, and Giannelli
and Monfardini (2003) for Italy.
But being on their own may mean diﬀerent things: children can choose
to live alone, live with a friend or to get married. Another strand of the
literature investigates the important role of the marriage market. As follows
from theoretical models of marriage when women are scarce relative to men,
i.e., a high sex ratio, there is an impact on labour supply, marriage and
divorce (i.e., Grossbard and Amuedo Dorantes, 2007).
Another factor which may implicitly or explicitly favour home-leaving
d e c i s i o n si st h ew e l f a r es t a t e .E s p i n gA ndersen (1999) has grouped countries
with similar welfare states and shows that in Northern European countries
(liberal and social democratic regimes) an early age of leaving home is the
norm due to the generous support for youth. In contrast, a very late age
prevails in the Southern European ones given that no welfare support to
youth is provided.
Each of the welfare regimes is also strongly intertwined with the strength
of family ties (Dalla Zuanna and Micheli 2004, Chiuri and Del Boca, 2008)1.
1According to Reher (1998), these diﬀerences have historical roots. The Northern
European pattern of “weak family ties” and early transition to adulthood is linked to
the medieval habit of leaving the parental home early for agricultural work or to become
a servant. On the contrary, in Southern Europe, the “strong family ties” pattern was
3A less generous welfare state in the South is compensated for strong family
ties, while a generous one in the North is associated with weak intergenera-
tional ties. Aasve et al (2001), have shown that in social democratic welfare
states, income and employment play a insigniﬁcant role for both daughters
and sons. The contrary is true in countries where the welfare state is less
generous.
In our empirical analysis we will further explore these diﬀerences, focus-
ing on the impact of institutional factors such as mortgage and labor market
and expenditures in youth policies on daughters and sons .
3D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
In our empirical analysis we use the ECHP, a longitudinal survey coordinated
and supported by EUROSTAT. The survey involves a representative sample
of households and individuals interviewed over eight years (1994-2001) in
each of the 15 European countries (EU-15). The standardized methodology
and procedure in data collection yield comparable information across coun-
tries, making the ECHP a unique source of information for cross-countries
analyses at the European level. The unit of analysis of the ECHP is the
family and, within the households, all individuals over 16. The ECHP has
many advantages: it covers the whole population, it includes a wide variety
of useful and harmonized information (for example number and age of chil-
dren, or marital status) and it is possible to link household-level information
to individual data.
The main question is how to make valid inference about population’s
parameters of interest when the data subject to unit nonresponse. Nicoletti
and Peracchi (2002) ﬁnd three main causes of survey nonparticipation in the
ECHP: refusal to cooperate, contact failure and ineligibility. Their analysis
of cross-country diﬀerences in survey participation rates tries to identify the
role played by diﬀerences in the socio-demographic composition of national
populations and in the characteristics of the data collection process. They
ﬁnd that several individual and household characteristics (such as number
of children, the length of residence at the current address, home ownership
and household income) have good predictive power
For our empirical analysis we select fourteen countries of the dataset,
representative of the diﬀerent geographical areas of Europe For the fourteen
countries we consider all available waves, creating an unbalanced panel. We
characterized by extensive periods of co-residence parents and adult children, in some
areas extending to the whole life.
4also select all households in which adult children are in the age range 18-34
and are observed living with parents for at least one wave. Table A.1 in
the Appendix reports the age distribution of adult children in the ECHP as
compared with our selected sample of children (coresiding with parents for
at least one wave).
Figure 1 plots the coresidence pattern by age and gender, for each coun-
try, describing how gender diﬀerences in children’s living arrangements are
distributed along their life course. While behavioral discrepancies fade away
in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK behavioral dis-
crepancies, in others, such as Greece or Austria they persist longer.
The ﬁrst group of variables that we consider regards personal character-
istics: adult children’s age and squared age, adult children’s gender and
a dummy variable controlling for tertiary education (college degree and
above). Table 1 reports coresidence rates and the proportion of children
with university degrees, by single country and gender. In all countries,
coresidence rates are larger for men and in some, such as Denmark and Fin-
land, the percentage of men coresiding is up to 10 percent higher than that
of women.
However, the proportion of tertiary education reported in Table 1 is
greater for women in most countries. The second group of variables includes
parental characteristics. Several measures of income are included in the
ECHP. We focus on annual incomes, rather than monthly incomes. All
incomes relate to the year prior to the survey.2 To capture non linearities
we include also a squared measure of fathers’ income.
The third group of variables includes family composition: the number
of siblings living in the household and the presence of grandparents.These
variables may imply the need of provide more care giving responsability, but
also more overcrowded living conditions. The average values reported for
every selected variable show a wide heterogeneity across EU countries.
The information given by the ECHP dataset was augmented with addi-
tional information taken from various statistical sources. In particular, we
consider a labor market indicator, computed on the basis of annual female
and male unemployment rates deﬁned at the regional level and a proxy for
the local marriage market, i.e., the local sex ratio computed as the probabil-
ity of ﬁnding a partner of the same age range in the region of residence (they
2The ECHP breaks down total income in three mutually exclusive categories, referred
to as public income, work income, and private (non-work) income. The ﬁrst category
comprises in particular social insurance receipts, family allowances, and sickness or inva-
lidity beneﬁts.Work income refers to wage and salary earnings or self-employment income.
Non-work private income includes private transfers from other household members.
5are both computed from the EUROSTAT REGIO dataset, years 1994-2001).
We also examine the loan to value ratio, which measures the availability of
mortgage ﬁnance by country. This is a measure of the conventional home-
purchase loans to ﬁrst-time buyers. Even though the loan to value ratio
might have changed over a decade, we consider the average values for two
decades, i.e. the 1990s and 2000s as reported in Chiuri and Jappelli (2003)
and in Maclennan et al. (1998). The country average values for the three
indicators are reported in Table 2, columns 1-3.
Following the standard time invariant grouping of the countries con-
sidered (Esping Andersen 1999), we combine them in four groups: Mediter-
ranean countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain), Central West-European
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands), Northern Continental European countries (Denmark and Finland)
and Northern non-continental European countries (the UK and Ireland).
The four groups of European countries identify not only geographical con-
tiguity, but also similar culture and welfare states. We also consider an
alternative and time varying measure of the country welfare state. In par-
ticular, we include the annual youth social expenditures as the percentage
of total public expenditures Computed on the basis of the OECD SOCX
(2006), youth social expenditure includes housing, active labor market poli-
cies and policies for other contingencies related to youth such as income
support programs. This proxy (Table 2, column 4) shows that Southern
European welfare states are less oriented towards helping young people to
start out and become economically independent when compared to Northen
European countries.
4 Methodological Framework
In our model, the living arrangements of adult children are the outcome
not only of personal and household characteristics, but also of variables
related to the characteristics of the socio-economic and cultural environment
in which the individual and the household live.While it is of interest to
model children leaving and reentering the household, in this analysis we only
consider the initial decision to leave the parental home given the extremely
low proportion of children returning home in our sample3. The econometric
speciﬁcation of the coresidence decision rule is assumed to be a quasi-reduced
form representation of the solution to the individual child’s optimization
3For an analysis of this phenomenon in the US see De Vanzo and Frances K. Gold-
scheider (1990), and Kaplan (2009).
6problem. As is common, a latent variable structure is assumed. Let the net
value of co-residence with parents for an adult child in period t be given by:
L∗
i,t = Hi,tβ1 + HHi,tβ2 + Ei,tβ3 + Ii,tβ4 + Wiβ5 + ui,t, (1)
where Hi,t is a row vector containing the observed variables measuring child
i’s human capital, age and gender at time t. HHi,t is the vector of house-
hold characteristics at time t for child i, and includes variables such as the
number of children in the household, the presence of grandparents, and par-
ents’ income. Ei,t is the vector of variables describing the socio-economic
environment (labor market characteristics, marriage market, the degree of
ﬁnancial market development, which is proxied by the down payment ratio)
that child i lives in at time t. The vector Ei,t varies by country and year,
but is the same for all individuals surveyed in a particular year and country.
The last group of vectors are Ii,t and Wi.T h eﬁrst one varies by the country
that i lives in and time t, a n dc o n t a i n st h ey o u t hs o c i a lp o l i c ye x p e n d i t u r e
as a percent of total public expenditure. The Wi vector is a set of dummy
variables that delineates the four groups of countries. Finally, the term ui,t is
a disturbance term, the distributional properties of which will be discussed
below.
Deﬁne the (dependent) variable di,t =1if i coresides with his/her parents
at time t, and set di,t =0if not. Then we have that
di,t =1⇔ L∗
i,t > 0.
We assume that the disturbances can be written as follows:
ui,t = ηi + εi,t.
where εi,t is independently and identically distributed as a logistic random
variable for all (i,t). We assume that the permanent component of each dis-
turbance term, ηi, is potentially not independently distributed with respect
to all of the observable characteristic si n c l u d e do nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo fi t s
respective equation. Using the estimator that we employ, no assumptions
need be made regarding ηi except that it be time-invariant.
Our main interest lies in examining the impacts of the institutional envi-
ronment, indicators of individual and family characteristics, as well as other
factors assumed unobservable to the analyst. One of the limitations of the
economic analysis of coresidence is, in fact, the omission of factors such as
tastes, and other individual and family-speciﬁc traits -for example conﬂict,
strictness and other important factors in explaining the decision to stay or
7leave home. Many, or most, of these individual-speciﬁcf a c t o r sa ﬀecting the
decision are unobservable to the researcher. Under our logistic speciﬁcation
of the disturbance εi,t, it is well known that the probability that child i will
coreside with his/her parents at time t is given by
p(di,t =1 |Xi,t,ηi)=
exp(Xi,tβ + ηi)
1+e x p ( Xi,tβ + ηi)
,i =1 ,...,N; t =1 ,...,T;
where Xi,t is the vector of all of the covariates associated with individual
i in period t (this vector contains all of the sub-vectors discussed when we
presented (1) and β is a (unknown) conformable parameter vector.
We use a ﬁxed eﬀects logit estimator to consistently estimate a subvector
of β, which consists of coeﬃcients associated with variables in Xi,t that vary
over time for at least some inidividuals in the sample. Chamberlain (1980)
deﬁned a conditioning scheme that transforms the data in such a way that
the terms (η) are eliminated and the simultaneity problem is avoided. The
outcome of this conditioning scheme is that the coeﬃcients associated with
time invariant characteristics cannot be identiﬁed. Other parameters will
be identiﬁable, and will be robust with respect to any form of association
between the observable heterogeneity (i.e., the variation on the manner in
which the unobservable heterogeneity is related to observable heterogeneity.
The estimator works oﬀ of timing variability. The conditioning scheme is to
look at the relative likelihood of living with parents in period t given that the
individual lived with the parents in exactly one of the periods. Thus, only
individuals who lived with parents in one of the periods are used to estimate
the identiﬁed subvector of β. The beneﬁt of this reduction in sample size is
the ability to robustly estimate the identiﬁed subvector of β. The estimates
are invariant with respect to the dependence between η and the covariates.
For purposes of our analysis, this is an extremely attractive feature. We
know that countries vary greatly in the proportion of adult children who
live with their parents. Some of this diﬀerences may be accounted for in
terms of diﬀerences in observable characteristics of the countries. Most of
the diﬀerences will be produced by diﬀerences in the distribution of η across
countries, however. The diﬀerent distributions of η across countries will have
no impact on our estimates of the identiﬁed subvector of β. By contrast,
if we were to estimate a cross-section logit speciﬁcation of the probability
of living with ones parents, all parameter estimates would be inconsistent
under this scenario. Even within a country as long as selection (or attrition)
is a function of unobservable factors it would not matter for the consistency
of our estimates. The cost of using this rather ﬂexible estimation method
is the inability to determine the eﬀect of variables which do not vary over
8time on the probability of coresiding in any given period. From the point
of view of conducting policy analysis, which typically requires having access
to estimates of all behavioral parameters, this may be a problem.
The conditional logit estimator also makes it diﬃcult to identify duration
eﬀects, so that we are limited in terms of how we can alter (1) to introduce
something akin to duration dependence of the kind that would typically
be included in a hazard speciﬁcation. The estimator basically works oﬀ of
diﬀerences in values of regressors over time. We have included the age of the
child, so that in successive periods, the diﬀerence in age is 1, and this “eﬀect”
is included in the constant term of the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation. Individuals
remaining at home would have their durations increase by a year each year,
so linear (in the index function) duration dependence would also show up in
the constant terms. In another paper, we have explored the ﬁt of a duration
model (a semi-parametric Cox model) (Chiuri and Del Boca, 2008)
5 Empirical Results
Table 3 shows the empirical results of the ﬁxed eﬀects logit model by gender.
T h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on age appears to be larger and more signiﬁcant for
daughters. Having tertiary education is positive for both daughters and sons,
whereas parental income is not statistically signiﬁcant on either sex. Both
variables describing the family structure, such as the number of siblings as
well the presence of grandparents in the household, increase the likelihood of
cohabiting with parents with larger impacts for daughters. The coeﬃcients
related to the labor and the mortgage market for housing are statistically
signiﬁcant but only for daughters while the remaining factors have similar
eﬀects.
In Table 4 and Table 5 we report the estimates by countries’ groups.
Table 4 reports the estimates for Northern countries (continental and non
continental). Having tertiary education is statistically signiﬁcant only for
sons as well as fathers’ income. Tertiary education increases the likelihood
of cohabiting with parents, while greater family resources has the opposite
eﬀect. Another important impact related to the family structure is that
the number of siblings increases the probability of remaining in the parental
home only for daughters in both contexts, while the presence of grandparents
has no signiﬁcant impact, conﬁrming the existence of weak intergenerational
ties. In these contexts, the family plays a modest role in providing elderly
care4. Being in a more favorable marriage market increases daughters’ like-
4In Northern countries where elderly coresidence with oﬀspring is less prevalent, the
9lihood of leaving home in Northern continental countries. On the contrary,
more diﬃcult labor market conditions increase daughters’ likelihood of re-
maining in the parental home. More generous social expenditure for youth
increases the likelihood of leaving home in Northern non continental coun-
tries for both.
In the liberal regimes, home-leaving decisions depend more on individual
and parental characteristics, in the socio-democratic regimes,where leaving
home early is the norm, individual, parental and institutional factors are
less signiﬁcant, conﬁrming previous results (Aasve et al 2001).
Table 5 reports the results for Central West and Mediterranean countries.
The coeﬃcients on individual characteristics are similar, In Mediterranean
countries, the father’s income coeﬃcient appears to be diﬀerent by gender:
positive for sons and negative for daughters. In other words, having greater
family resources encourage daughters to leave and sons to remain home.
Another peculiarity in Mediterranean countries concerns family structure.
Both the presence of siblings and that of grandparents implies a greater
likelihood of coresidence with parents.
The nstitutional factors’ impacts are more statistically signiﬁcant for
daughters in both contexts. The coeﬃcient related to youth social expendi-
ture is not signiﬁcant, probably due to the lower levels of expenditures.
For each of the speciﬁcations estimated, we also conducted a log like-
lihood ratio test to determine the degree to which the impact of individ-
ual and institutional characteristics on the rate of home leaving diﬀers by
gender. Given the large sample size, it may be expected that statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences are likely to be found. However, if gender diﬀerences
are only reﬂected in the constant term of the index function upon which
the conditional logit estimator is based, this eﬀect should be eliminated by
the pseudo-diﬀerencing upon which the estimator is based. We found that
in all speciﬁcations tested, there were signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences. This
indicates that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences (both statistically and behav-
iorally) in the eﬀects of covariates on the home-leaving decisions of both
sons and daughters. Gender ﬁlters the impacts of all of the covariates (even
the commonly shared ones) on the likelihood of cohabitation.
We will now provide some explorative evidence on the relationship be-
tween living arrangements and economic well-being. In this simple descrip-
tive analysis we compare the situation of those who have left home to the
situation of those who have not. Figures 2a and 2b show poverty rates by
well-being of the elderly is based on residential autonomy or on private or public nursing
homes
10whether a young person is still living in the parental home by the age of 25.
Poverty rates among sons are indicated by the dark lines, whereas they are
indicated by lighter lines for daughters. An individual in a given country
is considered to be poor if household income is less than 60 percent of the
contemporary median income of that country.
It appears that women who live on their own are on average poorer
than their male counterparts, and the diﬀerences are smaller when they
coahabit with parents. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence
indicating that women may accept worse jobs than men in order to leave
earlier (Cammelli 2005).
The diﬀerences across countries are consistent with the actual choices.
In Southern European countries women faring worse when on their own,
tend to leave home later than elsewhere.
However this cross country comparison does not take account that the
two groups may have diﬀerent characteristics or preferences, which may
underlie a selection eﬀect in the decision to leave home. Neverthless, this
evidence is consistent with econometric results which control for several fac-
tors. Parisi (2008) has shown that leaving home is associated with a higher
probability of having a low income in Southern European countries. This
result may also be interpreted in light of the existing diﬀerences in strength
of family ties across countries. In contexts with strong family ties, the family
plays an important role in defending its members against the diﬃculties im-
posed by social and economic constraints and children may receive support
and protection until they leave home. In areas with weak-family ties, where
the value attributed to individualism tends to predominate, young adults
leave home earlier (Aasve et al 2006).
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have explored the diﬀerences in leaving home of daughters and sons in
relation with several important factors: individual characteristics, parental
resources, family structure and institutional aspects. The relevance of these
factors diﬀers signiﬁcantly by countries and genders.
While in Northern continental countries, home-leaving decisions do not
appear to be largely related to economic variables, (parental income and
institutional factors), these variables play a more important role in the other
contexts. In Mediterranean countries parental income has actually opposite
eﬀects on daughters and sons: greater family resources is related to higher
rates of leaving home for daughters and higher rates of cohabiting with
11parents for sons.
Conﬁrming other gender diﬀerences, our results show that family struc-
ture appears to be more important for daughters in all contexts indicating
persistence of traditional roles. In addition, sons tend to be more unre-
sponsive than daughters to institutional factors. The design of labor market
policies that are intended to promote mobility for example may want to take
into account these types of diﬀerences.
Finally, the comparison between children coresiding with parents and
living independently reveals that women on their own tend to fare worse
than their male counterparts. In Southern European countries especially
women faring worse when live independently are likely to leave home later
than in other countries. The interpretation is that, in contexts where welfare
support for the youth is less generous, and the labor and mortgage market
is more limited, remaining in the parental home longer may lead to better
educational and occupational outcomes.
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  M  F  M  F 
Austria  0.92  0.86  0.02  0.04 
Belgium  0.80  0.78  0.23  0.25 
Denmark  0.60  0.50  0.06  0.09 
Finland  0.68  0.60  0.06  0.11 
France  0.79  0.72  0.22  0.25 
Germany  0.79  0.70  0.07  0.06 
Greece  0.92  0.87  0.14  0.20 
Ireland  0.90  0.87  0.14  0.17 
Italy  0.90  0.87  0.06  0.08 
Luxembourg  0.87  0.84  0.13  0.09 
Netherlands  0.75  0.68  0.02  0.03 
Portugal  0.88  0.86  0.04  0.08 
Spain  0.89  0.86  0.22  0.28 












Indicators of local marriage and labour markets by gender. Maximum loan to value ratio for 













  [F/(M+F)] *100  M  F    
Austria  49.35  3.14  4.63  80  3.47 
Belgium  49.22  6.71  10.32  80  6.57 
Denmark  49.08  4.29  5.83  80  11.71 
Finland  48.90  7.8  8.3  80  8.37 
France  49.53  7.86  11.38  80  9.03 
Germany  48.36  8.09  9.95  80  7.22 
Greece  48.28  4.67  11.38  75  5.86 
Ireland  49.41  8.42  8.17  80  14.28 
Italy  49.51  10.83  20.76  60  1.79 
Luxembourg  49.31  1.50  3.19  60  2.25 
Netherlands  49.14  3.05  4.97  75  10.07 
Portugal  49.65  3.15  4.78  80  4.64 
Spain  49.07  11.94  23.26  80  6.19 
U.K.  48.69  5.86  4.07  95  10.08 
Note. Average Sex Ratio computed as female population over total population by country regions from REGIO 
dataset (EUROSTAT), 1994‐2001. Average unemployment rate from REGIO dataset refers to the same years and 










































































































































































































Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic Regression.  
Dependent variable: coresident child (18-34 years old)- All countries 
 All  sample  Sons  Daughters 
VARIABLES      
    
Age -1.827***  -1.209**  -2.348*** 
 (0.230)  (0.317) (0.343) 
Age squared  0.001  -0.014*  0.008 
 (0.004)  (0.006) (0.007) 
Number of Siblings  0.817**  0.382*  1.923** 
 (0.269)  (0.254) (0.454) 
Education 1.068***  1.223***  0.968** 
 (0.135)  (0.195) (0.191) 
Parental income  -0.002 -0.802 -0.423 
 (0.370)  (0.647) (0.568) 
Parental income 
squared 
0.024 0.071 -0.008 
 (0.017)  (0.031) (0.026) 
Grandparents 2.157**  1.522*  3.242** 
 (0.436)  (0.537) (0.795) 
Sexratio 0.002*  0.003*  0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment 
rate  
0.059* 0.039  0.122** 
 (0.028)  (0.043)  (0.0394) 
Downpayment 0.002*  0.001  0.005** 
 (0.01)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Youth Policies  -0.554***  -0.569***  -0.535** 
 (0.080)  (0.111) (0.119) 
    
Number of cases  4240  2082  2158 
 
  
Standard errors in  parentheses     
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
 
Table 4- Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic Regression.  
 Per group of countries and gender – North Europe 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












      
Age -0.603 -1.474**  -1.738 -1.158** 
 (0.559)  (0.609)  (2.172) (0.734) 
Age  squared  -0.023* -0.0068 -0.027  0.097 
 (0.011)  (0.0131) (0.028)  (0.063) 
Number of 
Siblings 
0.270 1.893**  3.396 3.703* 
 (0.258)  (0.630)  (2.161) (1.556) 
Education 1.149***  0.461  0.331*  0.643 
 (0.275)  (0.270)  (0.142) (1.966) 
Parental 
Income 
-0.844 **  -0.850  -0.246*  -0.652 




0.647** 0.095  0.132  .299 
 (0.227)  (.145)  (0.525)  (.188) 
Grandparents 1.004  -1.166     
  (1.180) (1.038)    
Sexratio -0.002  0.007  0.013  -0.047* 
 (0.002)  (0.030)  (0.025) (0.020) 
Unemployment 
rate 
0.029 0.448**  0.465 -0.897 
 (0.099)  (0.123)  (0.768) (0.755) 
Downpayment -0.003  -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.002)) 
Youth policies  -.761**  -1.507***  -0.614  -1.052 
 (0.248)  (0.346)  (0.956) (0.720) 
      
Number of  
cases 
333 293 201 203 
 
 Standard  errors  in  parentheses      
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         Table 5- Conditional Fixed Effect Logistic Regression.  
 Per group of countries and gender – South Europe 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












      
Age  -2.428** -3.185***  -3.431** -2.836** 
 (0.539)  (0.517)  (0.927) (1.033) 
Age square  0.081  0.026**  -0.023  0.007 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016) (0.019) 
Number of 
Siblings 
0.669 1.546 2.352*  1.437* 
  (0.532) (1.117) (0.891) (.724) 
Education  1.101** 1.024** 1.055  2.078** 
 (0.331)  (0.309  (0.807) (0.577) 
Parental  Income  0.155 0.270 0.857*  -0.695** 
 (0.134)  (0.161)  (0.348) (.1882) 
Parental Income 
squared 
-0.083 -0.127 -0.407*  -0.298** 
 (0.068)  (0.091)  (0.145) (0.077) 
Grandparents  1.379  1.396* 2.377* 4.077** 
  (0.965) (.635)  (0.977) (0.728) 
Sexratio -0.002  0.003*  .008 0.0059* 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.055) (0.018) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.041 0.156* 0.392* 0.140* 
 (0.071)  (0.062)  (0.125) (0.054) 
Downpayment  0.004 0.020*  0.007 0.002* 
 (0.003))  (0.007))  (0.010) (0.001) 
Youth  policies  -0.296  0.043 0.357 -0.033 
 (0.200)  (0.226)  (0.262) (0.028) 
      
Number of cases  1180  1194  444  495 
 
 Standard  errors  in  parentheses      
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         Figure 2a  
Poverty rate for young adults independently living till the age of 25, observed at later years (26‐34) 






































Table A.1. Comparison by age of total 18-34 sample of adult children and sample of those 
coresiding at least for one wave.  
Country 
 
  18‐19  20‐24  25‐29  30‐34  No of obs. 
ECHP sample  5.86  11.85  28.22  54,07  11,476  Austria 
Coresid.for 1+ yr   8.80  20.15  37.93  33.92  6,054 
ECHP sample  5.56  10.32  26.09  58.03  12,378   
Belgium  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.39  20.99  42.22  27.40  5,749 
ECHP sample  4.66  9.74  26.78  58.81  10,955   
Denmark  Coresid.for 1+ yr  12.21  28.21  44.74  14.74  2,964 
ECHP sample  7.72  15.29  28.87  48.12  12,312   
Finland  Coresid.for 1+ yr  13.51  30.46  40.56  15.47  5,131 
ECHP sample  5.83  11.34  29.88  52.96  29,659   
France  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.89  22.11  43.39  24.61  13,216 
ECHP sample  4.93  9.64  25.11  60.32  31,260   
Germany  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.26  20.78  38.78  31.18  13.181 
ECHP sample  6.37  12.27  29.36  52.00  24,899   
Greece  Coresid.for 1+ yr  8.06  17.64  36.60  37.70  15,728 
ECHP sample  8.04  15.31  32.85  43.80  17,255   
Ireland  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.04  21.53  41.66  27.76  11,281 
ECHP sample  5.12  10.79  30.08  54.01  39,868   
Italy  Coresid.for 1+ yr  6.07  14.67  38.06  41.19  28,388 
ECHP sample  3.85  8.16  26.38  61.61  11,621   
Luxemb.  Coresid.for 1+ yr  5.95  15.20  37.64  41.22  5,477 




12.43  26.05  42.89  18.63 
6,153 
ECHP sample  6.51  13.46  33.28  46.74  24,315   
Portugal  Coresid.for 1+ yr  7.86  18.40  40.66  33.08  16,186 ECHP sample  5.62  12.09  30.90  51.39  38,038   
Spain  Coresid.for 1+ yr  6.77  16.63  39.43  37.17  26,053 
ECHP sample  4.88  10.89  28.44  55.80  23,163   
U.K.  Coresid.for 1+ yr  9.89  21.79  41.66  26.66  7,917 
 